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COMMISSIONER v. DANIELSON: TAXPAYER MAY
NOT CHALLENGE CONSIDERATION ALLOCATED
TO COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE ABSENT
SHOWING OF FRAUD, DURESS OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE
In CommissioneT v. Danielson1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a taxpayer may not challenge,
for tax purposes, the consideration specifically allocated to a covenant not to compete absent a showing of fraud, duress or undue
influence on the part of the other party to the covenant. 2 This
decision is a departure from the majority rule which only requires
the taxpayer to adduce "strong proof" to overcome the allocation.
Upon first impression this holding would seem to violate the principle of deciding questions of taxation according to truth and
substance without regard to form. 3 Upon closer analysis, however, the rule appears justifiable because of the special problems
involved in tax treatment of covenants not to compete. By honoring the parties' price allocation in the covenant, the Danielson
court attempted to achieve predictability of tax treatment in an
area currently marked by many conflicting and confusing decisions. This Note will analyze the Danielson rule in light of prior
case law on the degree of proof required to challenge the consideration allocated to a covenant not to compete and will evaluate
its soundness and probable consequences.
The taxpayers, stockholders in a small loan business, solicited
offers for its sale. Thrift Investment Corporation offered to buy
all the outstanding common stock along with a covenant not to
compete for $374 per share. Thrift explained that its offer was
higher than it would otherwise have been because it was passing
on to the vendors part of the favorable tax benefits which would
accrue. That is, because Thrift would be able to amortize the cost
of the covenant not to compete, 4 it was willing to pay a higher
total purchase price. 5
1. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 88 S. Ct. 94 (1967).
2. Id. at 777. The case was remanded to permit the parties a further
opportunity to produce evidence in accordance with this ruling.
3. The three dissenting judges relied on the principle that the substance of a transaction should always control form. Since the taxpayers
had established that the allocations did not reflect the substance of the
agreement, the dissent would have affirmed the tax court's judgment allowing the taxpayers to successfully challenge their agreement. 378 F.2d
at 783 (dissenting opinion).
4. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
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The proposed stock purchase and non-competition agreements
were drafted by Thrift. The covenant restricted the stockholders
from engaging in the small loan business around Butler, Pennsylvania, for approximately six years, but permitted them to own
stock of any small loan corporation. 6 The agreement was silent
concerning the portion of the total consideration to be allocated to
the covenant not to compete. At the time of settlement, all the
stockholders and their attorneys were present along with representatives of Thrift.
Thrift unilaterally allocated $152 per share to the covenant
not to compete and $222 per share to the contract for the sale of
stock. After these figures were inserted in the documents, the
vendors inquired about the tax treatment they would receive on
the $152 per share allocated to the covenant. Thrift said the
allocations were to its tax advantage, but made no attempt to explain that such amounts would be taxable to the vendors as ordinary income. 7 Thrift did not, however, lead the vendors to believe that they would receive capital gains treatment.8 The vendors discussed the allocation with their attorney and signed the
agreements on his advice.
On their tax returns all the stockholders reported their share
of the amount received as proceeds from the sale of capital assets.
The Commissioner determined that the amount attributed to the
value of the stock was properly reported, but designated the
amount allocated to the covenant not to compete as ordinary income. A deficiency notice was issued and the taxpayers petitioned for a redetermination.
In the tax court, the Commissioner urged the adoption of a
"new rule" of law concerning the treatment of written covenants
not to compete. The proposed rule would have prevented either
contracting party or the Commissioner from subsequently attacking
the stated consideration in such agreements unless fraud, duress
or undue influence existed at the time they were signed., The
taxpayers, knowing that if the covenant stood it would result in
ordinary income to them, wanted the total purchase price allocated to the stock-a capital asset. 10 Therefore, they contended
that the amount assigned to the covenants did not reflect the real
agreement of the parties.
6. This fact was viewed by the tax court as an indication that the

covenants were not fully restrictive. See Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549,
556 (1965).
7. See notes 14 & 15 infra.and accompanying text.

8. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.

9. Adoption of this rule was first advocated in; Note, Tax Treatment
of Covenants not to Compete: A Problem of Purchase Price Allocation,
67 YALE L.J. 1261, 1268, (1958). This was the only mention of the "new

rule" until its adoption was urged by the Commissioner in Danielson.
10.

Then they could show capital gains to the extent that the

amount of money received exceeded the bases.
1954, §§ 1011, 1016.

See

INT. REv. CODE OF
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After finding that the covenants were not fully restrictive,"
that none of the stockholders were realistically in a position to
compete, 12 and therefore that the covenants lacked an independent basis in fact,' 3 the tax court said the taxpayers had sufficiently established by "strong proof" that the price allocated to the
covenants did not reflect the substance of the parties' agreement.14
They held that the amount specifically allocated as payment for
each vendor's covenant not to compete should not, for tax purposes, be treated as having been received for the covenants.
The court of appeals accepted the factual findings of the tax
court, but vacated the decision and remanded on the basis of their
adoption of the rule that a taxpayer should be held to the allocations set forth in his contract as written absent a showing of fraud,
duress or undue influence.
TAX TREATMENT OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE

The sale of a business with a covenant not to compete produces
conflicting tax consequences to the vendor and vendee. Payments
received by the vendor for his covenant are taxable as ordinary
income.'5 The rationale for this treatment is that the covenantor
11. The covenants were not fully restrictive because they contained
nothing to prevent the stockholders from later establishing a small loan
company to duplicate, for all practical purposes, the business they sold.
Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549, 556 (1965).
12. When the agreements were executed, one of the stockholders was
a 93 year old retired businessman who rarely left his home and whose
affairs were conducted by his wife. Three stockholders were housewives
with no knowledge of the small loan business and another was in the
real estate business 60 miles beyond the area covered by the covenant.
The remaining stockholder was a busy and successful surgeon. Carl L.
Danielson, 44 T.C. 549, 557 (1965).
13. The standard used by the tax court to determine whether the
covenant reflected the substance of the agreement was that "the covenant
must have some independent basis in fact or some arguable relationship
with business reality such that reasonable men, genuinely concerned with
their economic future, might bargain for such an agreement." Carl L.
Danielson, 44 T.C. 549, 556 (1965). The first case to apply this test was
Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961), aft'g 34 T.C. 235
(1960).
14. The test used by the tax court regarding the degree of proof required for a party to successfully attack his agreement was that "when the
parties to a transaction such as this one have specifically set out the
covenants in the contract and have there given them an assigned value,
strong proof must be adduced by them in order to overcome that declaration." Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549, 556 (1965). The first case to formulate this test was Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959),
aff'g 29 T.C. 129 (1957).
15. The early decisions set the precedent, e.g., Cox v. Helvering, 71
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Christensen Mach. Co., 18 B.T.A. 256 (1929);
Black River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A. 490 (1929), and have been consistently
followed; see, e.g., Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th
Cir. 1954); Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959). For a

Winter 1968]

NOTES

has surrendered his right to earn income from a particular form
of service. The consideration received is deemed the equivalent of
compensation for the affirmative act of rendering the personal
service. 16
The vendee, on the other hand, obtains a depreciation deduction
through amortization of the cost of the covenant over its useful
life.'
The theory permitting amortization is that the buyer has
purchased a valuable capital asset in the form of freedom from
competition for the term of the covenant. Since the covenant is
worthless upon expiration of the period, its cost is a capital expenditure and subject to a depreciation allowance. 8
When the covenants accompany the sale of a business, however,
the transfer of goodwill 19 is also relevant. 20 Ordinarily, an excess
of purchase price over the value of all tangible and identifiable
intangible assets is attributed either to goodwill or the covenant.
If the excess is ascribed to goodwill and not the covenant, the
vendor receives favorable capital gains treatment, for goodwill is
general discussion of the treatment of payments received for covenants not
to compete as ordinary income see 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 22.33 (rev. ed. 1966).
16. See Beal's Estate, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936); Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935), affd, 297 U.S. 106 (1936); 3B MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.33 (rev. ed. 1966).
17. See, e.g., Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959);
Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954). In order
to depreciate the cost over the term of the covenant, the elimination of
competition must be for a definite and limited term. See Clark Thread
Co., 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933), aff'd, 100 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1938); 4 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.68 (rev. ed. 1966).
18. See Farmers Feed Co., 17 B.T.A. 507, 551-54 (1917); 4 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.68 (rev. ed. 1966).
19. For discussion of the concept of goodwill see McDonald, Goodwill
and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645 (1959); Note, An Inquiry
A
into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 664-65 (1953).
well-known definition of goodwill was offered by Justice Story:
Goodwill may be properly enough described to be the advantage or
benefit which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere
value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed therein, in
consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement
which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account
of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill,
or influence, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities,
or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.
STORY, PARTNERSHIPS § 99, at 158 (5th ed. 1859).

20. The goodwill factor is relevant whether the business is transferred
by a sale of assets or a sale of stock. In a sale of assets, the assets, goodwill and covenant not to compete are independent items. In a sale of
stock, the stock and covenant are distinct factors, but the assets and goodwill combined determine the value of the stock. In either type of transfer
the amount by which the purchase price exceeds the stated value of the
assets, to the extent that it is not allocated to the covenant, will be allocated
to goodwill. Thus the determination of the dollar value of the covenant
involves the same considerations in either situation.
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a capital asset. 1 Since it is considered a capital asset with an
indeterminable
life, however, the buyer is not permitted to amor22
tize its cost.

The interests of the vendor and vendee are antithetical in
negotiating the amount to be allocated between the covenant not to
compete and goodwill. The vendor, preferring capital gains to
ordinary income, will seek a greater allocation to goodwill and a
lower allocation to the covenant. The vendee will seek total allocation to the covenant, which has a limited life and furnishes depreciation deductions.
JUDICIAL TESTS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND VALUE OF THE COVENANT

The foregoing principles governing the tax treatment of covenants not to compete and goodwill are simple and well settled.
The source of the confusion and litigation is the basically factual question whether the covenant has an ascertainable value independent from the goodwill transferred with the business and the
dollar amount of that value. The vagueness of prior standards
used by the courts to make this determination has resulted in conflicting decisions and yielded total unpredictability.
Three major tests have been formulated to determine whether
the covenant has independent value: whether the covenant can
be segregated from goodwill; whether a genuine covenant exists;
and whether the covenant has any independent significance.
Older cases attempted to resolve the issue on the relation between
the covenant and goodwill and classified the covenant as either
"severable" or "nonseverable" from the goodwill transferred. 28 If
the covenant was not treated separately in respect to cost and value,
it was considered "nonseverable" and only a contributing element
of the assets transferred. 24 On the other hand, if the agreement
could be segregated, assuring that a separate item had been sold,
25
the covenant was "severable" and assigned an independent value.
The second standard, originally adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Schulz v. Commissioner,26 said the applicable test is that the
"covenant must have some independent basis in fact or some arguable relationship with business reality such that reasonable men,
21. See Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143, 149 (1949); Aaron Michaels,
12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1
CUM. BULL. 127.
23. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., 209 F.2d 926 (10th
Cir. 1954), aff'g 19 T.C. 692 (1953); Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949);
Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1950);
Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943).
24. The result was capital gains treatment for the vendor and a
non-depreciable item for the vendee. See cases cited note 23 supra.
25. The amount assigned to the covenant was ordinary income to
the vendor and amortizable by the vendee. See cases cited note 23 supra.
26. 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961).
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genuinely concerned with their economic future, might bargain
for such an agreement." 27 This approach considers the pertinent
issue to be the factual question whether a genuine covenant exists. The rationale is that since a covenant which has a basis in
economic reality must contribute to goodwill, the determination
whether the covenant
is "severable" or "nonseverable" is of no
28
probative value.
A majority of courts have rephrased the "severability" tests
in formulating the present generally accepted test: whether "the
covenant is so closely related to a sale of goodwill that it fails to
have any independent significance apart from merely assuring
the effective transfer of that goodwill. '291 Although this test of
independent significance and the test adopted in Schulz both present some measurable standard, the problem of separating the
goodwill from the covenant on a dollar basis remains after the
determination that the covenant has value.
Whichever test was used to determine the factual issue of
the covenant's value, the degree of proof required of taxpayers
challenging their agreements was settled. As stated in Ullman v.
Commissioner,30 if the parties "have specifically set out the covenants in the contract and have given them an assigned value,
strong proof must be adduced by them in order to overcome that
declaration."' 3 1 When first adopted this test appeared to be a
workable approach to the problem,3 2 but the wide variety of factors
considered in determining whether the "strong proof" requirement has been met has made it impossible to predict in a given
case which factor or factors will be sufficient to overcome the
stated value allocated to the covenant.
Before Danielson, then, a court was faced with one or more of
the following difficult inquiries: (1) whether the covenant was
"severable" from goodwill; (2) whether the covenant had an "ar27. Id. at 55.
28. For other cases applying this test see, e.g., Barran v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964); Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner,
314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962). Aside from this practical matter, there is ample
authority from the common law concerning covenants that an agreement
not to compete must protect goodwill to some degree or else it is unenforceable. See Clark v. Needham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N.W. 1027 (1900); Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co., v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35 N.E. 98 (1895). See
generally CoRnrx, CONTRACTS § 1387 (rev. ed. 1962).
29. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 1959). For
other cases applying this test see, e.g., Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d
298 (3d Cir. 1963); Dairy Services, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 605 (1966).
30. 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
31. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
32. The "strong proof" requirement announced in Ullman was the
first clear statement of the degree of proof which must be produced by a
party seeking to ignore an express allocation to a covenant and the first
attempt to give predictability to the tax treatment of covenants not to

compete.
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guable relationship with business reality"; (3) whether the covenant had an "independent significance apart from goodwill"; and
(4) having found a covenant to exist, what constituted a showing
of "strong proof" to rebut its stated value. Conflicting decisions
and needless uncertainty ensued, as evidenced by the varying factual elements given weight by the courts in determining the value
of the covenant. 33
Awareness of tax consequences. Compare Schulz v.
33. E.g., (1)
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961) and Harry Schwartz, 19 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1276 (1960) (seller's unawareness of the unfavorable tax
consequences involved in allocating an amount to a covenant not to compete was a ground for not holding him to his agreement), with Balthrope
v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966), Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954), Dairy Service, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 605 (1966) and Fulton Container Co., Inc., 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 93549
(S.D. Cal. 1965) (seller held to his agreement despite his unawareness of
the tax consequences).
(2)
Absence of specific allocation. Compare Estate of Masquelette,
239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956) and Andrew A. Monaghan, 40 T.C. 680 (1963)
(absence of allocation a ground for capital gain treatment), with Rinehart
Oil News Co., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 942 (1965) (despite failure to allocate,
covenant was taxed as ordinary income) and Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C.
143 (1949). Compare Rinehart Oil News Co., supra, (court would not disturb the intention of the parties not to allocate), with Wilson Athletic
Goods Mfg. Co., 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955) (parties' failure to allocate
was disregarded and the court assigned a value to the covenant).
(3)
Presence of specific allocation. Compare Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959) (presence of specific allocation a
ground for taxing the proceeds as ordinary income) and Hamlin's Trust
v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954), with Toledo Newspaper
Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943) (despite a specific stated amount, the covenant was
taxed as capital gains) and United Finance & Thrift Corp. v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1960) (despite a specific allocation, the court placed
its own value on the covenant).
Whether the vendor is a shareholder, proprietor, or partner.
(4)
The courts have attempted to distinguish the sale of a proprietorship or
partnership in which the vendor is said to have a direct relationship to
the goodwill and therefore receives capital gain treatment, see, e.g.,
Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949), from the sale of stock by a shareholder
who supposedly has no goodwill to transfer since it is an asset of the
corporation, and whose covenant is therefore taxed as ordinary income,
Aside from the merit of
see, e.g., Richard Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957).
this distinction (if the vendor-stockholder is in a position to compete, his
covenant has as much value as that of the proprietor or partner who is in
a position to compete), the cases have not been uniform in applying the
distinction. Compare Richard Ullman, supra, (stockholder-vendor's covenant taxed as ordinary income), with George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954)
(stockholder-vendor accorded capital gains treatment).
(5)
Realistic allocation. Although many cases have held that the
covenant must have some arguable relationship with business reality, e.g.,
Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961), a number of recent
decisions have not let an unreasonable allocation stand in the way of holding the vendor to his agreement, see, e.g., Federal Oil Co., 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 996 (1966); Benjamin Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966); B. Lichtman, 23
CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964).
(6)
When the covenant is inserted as a tax benefit to the buyer.
Compare Harry Schwartz, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1276 (1960) and George
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The lack of a clearly defined standard for tax treatment of a
covenant not to compete also caused considerable problems for both
taxpayers and the Commissioner. The most notable difficulties
were frequent nullifications of the reasonably predictable tax consequences of the agreement and the difficult burden placed on the
Commissioner in attempting to make a proper apportionment between the covenant and goodwill. Because of these difficulties and
the conflicting tax consequences to the vendor and vendee, courts
have recently placed increasingly greater weight upon the contractual allocations agreed to by the parties themselves.3 4
COMPARISON OF DANIELSON WITH RECENT CASES

Since the tax court in Danielson made a specific finding that
the taxpayers sustained the burden of "strong proof," and since
this degree of proof failed to satisfy the new test, it would appear
that the Third Circuit has adopted a totally new rule of law. A
sufficient showing of strong proof has been made in very few cases
and no court has held the taxpayer to his agreement when the
burden was met. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Danielson rule is new in name only. It is a logical development and not
a complete break with prior law.
First, several cases decided under the strong proof rule contained facts and holdings which substantially support the rule espoused in Danielson.5 For example, in BaIthrope v. Commissioner,36 taxpayers attempting to meet the strong proof requireH. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954) (that the covenant was injected by the
vendee to obtain a tax advantage was a ground for not holding the vendor
to his agreement), with Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1966), Rogers v. United States, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961) and Jack
Zeigelheim, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 431 (1967) (amount allocated to the
covenant upheld despite a tax avoidance scheme on the part of the
purchaser).
(7) Conditon of the covenantor. Although age, health, previous activity and future plans of the covenantor have been considered by the
courts in attempting to ascertain the value of a covenant, it is difficult to
determine from the cases how much weight has been given to such factors.
Compare Max J. Epstein, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1964) (vendor
successfully attacked the covenant by showing that he was 74 years old,
ill, and had no intention of competing with the vendee), with Balthrope v.
Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966) (that the vendor told the vendee
that he was sick and would never compete with him held to be of no
consequence).
34. See, e.g., Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966);
Montesi v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1965); Rogers v. United
States, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961); Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305
(2d Cir. 1959); Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir.
1954); Benjamin Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966); B. Lichtman, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966);
Benjamin Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966); Dairy Service, Inc., 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 605 (1966); B. Lichtman, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964).
36. 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966).
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ment presented facts far more convincing than the facts in
Danielson. The vendor told the vendee that he was ill and could
never compete with him. The buyer prepared the agreements
and was in control of the negotiations. The covenant not to compete was discussed for only five minutes and the vendor, not represented by counsel, was completely unaware of the unfavorable
tax consequences. The vendor was clearly responsible for the
goodwill of the business and the total consideration was not in
excess of the book value of the assets transferred. These facts, as
the dissent in Balthrope noted, 37 should have been sufficient to
meet the strong proof test. Both Danielson and Balthrope held the
vendor to his agreement, but under different rules. The Balthrope
court, therefore, would apparently sustain the taxpayer's attack on
the agreement only by a showing of fraud, duress or undue influence. The only difference between the two cases is that the Balthrope court did not announce the rule which in substance it was
applying.
The result reached in Danielson is also similar to recent cases
upholding covenants in the face of unrealistic allocations while
still purporting to apply the strong proof rule. In Benjamin Levinson,38 for example, the court said:
While we believe that a somewhat more realistic allocation
of the purchase price might have been made, and recognize
that the purchasers were acutely aware of the tax advantages of the allocation made in the agreement, nevertheless
we are convinced that the agreement was made freely, willingly, and knowingly between two parties dealing at arm's
length and we are not inclined to reform their agreement
for them, which it seems unlikely [the vendor] could unilaterally do on his own behalf, for tax purposes. "
To the same effect is B. Lichtman,40 where, after finding that the
vendors did not enter into the agreement as a result of mistake,
fraud, duress or misrepresentation, the court stated:
Regardless of the [un] reasonableness of the allocation of
the purchase price between the covenant not to compete
and the other assets, it is evident that our acceptance of
petitioner's present objections would require us to disregard the existing agreement. . . . We are not inclined to
ignore the contract and create a new one. ... 41

In light of these decisions, the language in Danielson holding the
parties to their agreement even though the evidence "would support a finding that the explicit allocation had no independent basis
in fact or arguable relationship with business reality" 42 is not with37. Id. at 35 (dissenting opinion).
38. 45 T.C. 380 (1966).
39. Id at 389
40. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964).
41. Id. at 1747.
42. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 777 (3d Cir. 1967).
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out support.
A third element placing Danielson in proximity to cases
applying the strong proof rule is the recent emphasis on the intent
of the parties. In earlier cases the questions of "severability"
and "economic reality" were the relevant inquiries and the parties' intent was not given much weight. In Annabelle Candy Co.
v. Commissioner43 and Rinehart Oil News Co.,4 4 however, the
courts held that although the covenant played a substantial part
in the negotiations and would have been a valuable benefit to the
vendee, if the parties did not intend to allocate a part of the purchase price to the covenant, their intent must be respected.43
Cases sustaining an allocation despite a lack of real bargaining
for the covenant also support Danielson in substance. Following
the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner,4" these cases held that brief negotiation and unawareness
of tax consequences, factors usually indicative of a lack of realistic bargaining, do not prevent the court from upholding an agreement.4 7 As stated in Hamlin's Trust:
It is reasonably clear that the sellers failed to give consideration to the tax consequences of the provision, but
where parties enter into an agreement with a clear understanding of its substance and content, they cannot be
heard to say later that they overlooked possible tax consequences. . . . Having thus agreed, the taxpayers are
was not the substance
not at liberty to say that 4such
8
and reality of the transaction.
That Danielson held the vendors to their agreement because they
understood what they were signing, despite a lack of extensive
negotiations and their unawareness of tax consequences, is therefore not a complete departure from prior decisions.
Perhaps the strongest support for the Danielson rule comes
from those cases which have held parties to their agreement
allocated to
mainly because a stated consideration was specifically
49
the covenant. As noted in Barran v. Commissioner:
The courts that have contributed to the jurisprudence in
this field seem to hold that where the parties bargain at
arm's length over the terminology to be used in expressing
43. 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962).
44. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 942 -(1965), aff'd per curiam, 369 F.2d 692
(5th Cir. 1966).
45. In both cases there was no allocation to the covenant and the
vendees attempted to amortize an amount they felt the covenant was
worth. In both the burden of strong proof was held to apply to vendees
as well as vendors.
46. 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
47. See Dairy Service, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 605 (1966); Fulton
Container Co., 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 93549 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
48. 209 F.2d at 765.
49. 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964).
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an agreement not to compete and conclude with a specific
agreement including a separately stated consideration not
to compete, this amounts to something like a bargain between them that the seller, covenantor, will assume the
unfavorable tax consequences flowing from the receipt of
the consideration and the purchaser will get the corresponding tax benefits .... 50
These cases upholding the valuation of a covenant because it was
freely entered into, regardless of the economic reality of the situation,5 1 are tantamount to the rule of Danielson requiring proof
of fraud, duress or undue influence. Indeed Rogers v. United
States,52 decided under the strong proof rule, noted that "third
parties may question the resolutions of parties to a contract, but
in the absence of fraud it is not ordinarily open to the bargainers
to do so.' ' 58 Rogers held that although the taxpayers had probably
been maneuvered by the vendees into a tax disadvantage, since
they agreed in writing to a specific allocation to the covenant, the
court could refuse to look behind the agreement and properly sustain the allocation on its face.
Examination of these decisions leads to one of two conclusions.
Either these recent cases have been applying a Danielson type of
rule while purporting to apply the strong proof rule, or, as the
Third Circuit believed, the strong proof rule requires that a taxpayer be held to his agreement unless there is a showing of fraud,
duress or undue influence. 54 From either point of view, the
Danielson court was on firm ground in stating that prior case law
reflected in substance the principle which they espoused.
The dissent described the rule adopted by the majority as an
arbitrary one with no judicial precedent. 55 Granted that in no
case relied on by the majority which held parties to their agreement was there a finding that the taxpayer had sustained his
burden of strong proof. In Danielson, however, the court was confronted with that very situation because of their acceptance of
the factual findings of the tax court. As previously noted, however, most of these cases involve analogous fact situations which
yield similar results through the application of standards which
differ in name only.
The dissent argued that the new rule completely disregarded
Supreme Court decisions requiring questions of taxation to be de50. Id. at 58 n.2. The court said they did not have to go this far to
agree that there is a heavy burden on the taxpayer disputing the allocation.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Benjamin Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966).
290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961).

53. Id.
54. The Danielson court felt the strong proof rule required a showing
of fraud, duress or undue influence, but nevertheless adopted the new rule
in the event their belief was unwarranted. 378 F.2d at 777.
55. 378 F.2d at 779 (dissenting opinion).
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cided according to truth and substance without regard to form. 56
Their reasoning is inapplicable, however; in looking only to general principles,5 7 the dissent failed to acknowledge that the peculiar
characteristics 58 of the covenant transaction have created the aforementioned difficulties for courts required to determine the existence or value of a disputed non-competition agreement. Accordingly, the dissenters could not appreciate the desirability of a rule
which would give more credence to the form of the agreement
selected by the parties.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DANIELSON RuLE

Although the Danielson rule is a statement of the kind of proof
which must be adduced in a court proceeding to enable a taxpayer
to successfully attack the stated consideration allocated to his
covenant not to compete, the consequences of the rule will extend
far beyond the courtroom.
The new rule will first logically affect the vendor and vendee
in negotiating the amount to be allocated to a covenant not to
compete. Because of the predictability the rule gives to the tax
treatment of covenants, parties will be able to confidently structure their sales contracts to achieve the desired tax results. Since
the desires of the vendor and vendee are antithetical, the presumed tax consequences have a real bearing on the total purchase
price. Before Danielson the vendor could agree to a high allocation
to the covenant and then attack the agreement as not reflecting
56. The dissent, although not grounding their opinion on this basis,
also argued that parol evidence is always admissible to show that the true
consideration for the agreement was other than that recited in the written
contract. Consequently, they did not believe that the parol evidence rule
was applicable to these cases. 378 F.2d at 782 n.3. The majority, on the
other hand, felt the parol evidence rule would apply in this situation and
that it would restrict the type of evidence the attacking party might
adduce. Even if the rule was not a bar, the majority construed all the
evidence adduced in this case as insufficient to show that the contract was
not the parties' conscious agreement. 378 F.2d at 779.
57. None of the cases relied on by the dissent involved covenants not
to compete, but were old and easily distinguishable cases cited only for
general principles. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (Commissioner attacked the form of a corporate reorganization as being without
substance); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939)
(taxpayer disallowed depreciation on three buildings; court said although
written form of agreement was a transfer of ownership with a lease-back,
it was actually a loan secured by the property involved); Bartels v.
Birmingham, 322 U.S. 126 (1947) (action to recover taxes paid under Social
Security Act; question whether band members were employees of owner
of business establishment, as stated in contract, or were actually employees of the bandleader); Landa v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 431 (D.C.
Cir. 1953) (question whether the consideration for certain payments made
by a husband arose out of the marital relationship or were made to discharge his obligation for alimony).
58. The tax consequences of this type of transaction flow from its
economic nature. See notes 15-18 supra.
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the economic reality of the transaction 5 9 thereby also gaining a tax
advantage in the form of capital gains treatment. The effect was
to grant a unilateral reformation of the agreement with a resulting unjust enrichment.60 The vendee, since he would not be allowed to amortize, would lose a tax advantage for which he had
given extra consideration. Since the tax saving was so unlikely to
materialize, vendees were discouraged from paying extra consideration for the covenant.
Under Danielson, the vendor must decide whether he wants
a low allocation to the covenant with a correspondingly higher
proportion of capital gains treatment, or a high allocation and possibly greater consideration with ordinary income treatment for the
price of the covenant. The vendee, on the other hand, will be willing to increase his price because of the certainty of obtaining a
tax benefit in the form of amortization. Prior to Danielson, vendors were encouraged to unjustifiably risk litigation in order to
obtain the benefits of their agreement as well as favorable tax
treatment of it. The vendee often found himself forced to defend
the agreement in order to amortize the amount allocated to the
covenant. 61
The dissent viewed the new rule as opening the door for individuals to avoid unfavorable tax consequences by artificial
agreements: "[T]he difficult burden of showing fraud . . . placed
upon the parties by the majority virtually insures that knowledgeable buyers will engage in questionable and sharp dealing to
secure the advantages of such covenants, and the majority's rule
will shield their agreements. ' 62 This view, however, ignores a major beneficial purpose of the new rule: to delimit how far a party
may go in negotiating the price for the covenant. It permits shrewd
dealing and hard bargaining, but draws the line at fraud, duress
59. This is how most of the litigation in this, area arises, but cases also
arise in which the vendee is seeking to amortize a certain amount when
there has been no allocation to the covenant. See, e.g., Annabelle Candy
Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 1 :(9th Cir. 1962); Rinehart Oil News Co.,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Meem. 942 (1965).
60. The following hypothetical illustrates the point. Assume the assets of a business are worth $80,000. The vendee offers to pay the
vendor $100,000 if $30,000 of the purchase price can be allocated to a covenant not to compete. The original cost to the vendee is greater, but he
receives a benefit by being able to amortize $30,000. The increased purchase price is a benefit to the vendor, but this is qualified by the fact that
it is ordinary income to him. If the vendor is allowed to successfully
attack the allocation, he receives the extra consideration and also the benefit of having it taxed as capital gains. On the other hand, the vendee is
forced to pay the increased amount while losing his amortization benefit.
61. For an interesting case holding the vendee liable for attorney's
fees incurred by the vendor in successfully contesting the deficiency asserted against it because of the vendee's allocation, see Stern & Co. v.
State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965).
62. 378 F.2d at 782 (dissenting opinion).
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and undue influence. The rule is designed to protect valid contracts and not, as the dissent viewed it, to shield sham agreements.
That one party is more fully aware of the ramifications of the
transaction than the other is no reason to permit the other to attack the agreement. 63 Unilateral reformation of a valid agreement
should not be permitted merely because of its unfavorable consequences.
Danielson is also of major consequence to the Commissioner,
since it greatly facilitates the tax collection process. Previously
when a vendor ignored the contractual allocation and reported the

total purchase price as capital gains, and the vendee relied upon
the allocation and claimed depreciation deductions, the Commissioner was forced to challenge at least one of the positions to resolve the inconsistency. He would often be forced to take in64
consistent positions and face litigation against both parties.
Under Danielson, the Commissioner can more readily accept taxpayers' agreements at face value with the knowledge that allocations can only be overthrown by a showing of fraud, duress or
undue influence.

Furthermore, tax revenue will not be significantly impaired
by allocations which may not reflect true values. 65

Excessive

depreciation deductions produced by undue allocation to the covenant are balanced by the increased amount of ordinary income received by the vendor. Conversely, an understated allocation to the
covenant, though increasing the proportion of capital gains for the
vendor, reduces depreciation deductions available to the vendee.
The reason for looking to substance over form in questions of taxation is to prevent frustration of the operation of the tax laws by
forced adherence to the form chosen by the parties to reflect their
transaction. Because of the aforementioned balancing factors, however, the allocations in a non-competition agreement cannot result in a loss of revenue or otherwise contravene the tax laws.66
CONCLUSION

The Danielson rule makes prior unsatisfactory standards obsolete and eliminates the many difficult, if not impossible, factual
inquiries which previously plagued the courts. All are superseded
by the clear statement that a party wishing to challenge the
amount specifically allocated to a covenant not to compete must
63. See Rogers v. United States, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961).
64. Not knowing which party treated the covenant properly, the
Commissioner would have to join both in the same action or risk the possibility of two separate lawsuits.
65. Impairment of tax revenue could only occur through careful planning by parties in significantly different tax brackets.
66. For another analysis of the Danielson rule see Comment, The
Danielson Rule on the Tax Consequences of a Covenant Not to Compete,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 517 (1968).
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show that fraud, duress or undue influence existed at the time the
agreement was signed. The benefits of Danielson are the predictable tax consequences it provides for parties contemplating a
non-competition agreement and the clear standard it furnishes to
aid courts in resolving a disputed allocation. It is submitted that
the Danielson rule should be adopted by the other courts of appeals to assure uniform tax treatment of covenants not to compete.
L. FREDERICK NEFF

